"In August 2008, cyberwar associated with the Russian Federation struck once more, this time against Georgia. The DDoS attacks began in the weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russian invasion and continued after the Kremlin announced that it had ceased hostilities on August 12th."This excerpt is from the 29 page report available for download from HostExploit.com or georgiaupdate.gov.ge this is probably the most thorough analysis available on the cyberwarfare related to Georgia.
Concerning RBN (Russian Business Network)
"The individual, with direct responsibility for carrying out the cyber "first strike" on Georgia, is a RBN operative named Alexandr A. Boykov of Saint Petersburg, Russia. Also involved in the attack was a programmer and spammer from Saint Petersburg named Andrey Smirnov. These
men are leaders of RBN sections and are not "script-kiddies" or "hacktivists," as some have maintained of the cyber attacks on Georgia – but senior operatives in positions of responsibility with vast background knowledge.
Intelligence can suggest further information about these individual cyber-terrorists. According to Spamhaus SBL64881, Mr. Boykov operates a hosting service in Class C Network 79.135.167.0/24. It should be noted that the pre-invasion attacks emanated from 79.135.167.22, clearly showing professional planning and not merely ‘hacktivism.’ Due to the degree of professionalism and the required massive costs to run such operations, a state-sponsor is suspected. Further information gathered also links the RBN to known disruptive websites.
• The IP addresses of the range, 79.135.160.0/19 are assigned to Sistemnet Telecom to provide services to companies who are classified as engaging in illicit activities such as credit card fraud, malware and so on.
• 79.135.160.0/19 Sistemnet Telecom and AS9121 TTNet (Turkey) are associated with AbdAllah_Internet which is linked with cybercrime hosting such as thecanadianmeds.com. These are known Russian Business Network routes. "
The puzzle of StopGeorgia.ru = follow the rabbit?
To add to the report, and shed light on the ongoing puzzle of the attack site StopGeorgia.ru (click on diagrams to enlarge):
Figure 1 - The IP route diagram route for StopGeorgia.ru (note: steadyhoster.com)
Figure 2. - The IP route diagram for SteadyHoster.com (note: for both fig1 /2 74.86.81.232.infomart.reverse.dnska.com)
Protect Details, Inc - (privatecontact@protectdetails.com)
29 Kompozitorov st. Saint Petersburg, 194358 RU
Figure 3. - Welcome to London GB, the IP route diagram for InnovativeITsolutions.com - actual home of 'StopGeorgia.ru' - AKA; dnska.com reseller for AS36351 SOFTLAYER Technologies
Innovation IT Solutions Corp.
Andrey Nesterenko(admin@mirhosting.com)
95 Wilton Road,
London,SW1V 1BZ,GB
